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"Death and Taxes" or Death without Taxes?
INTRODUCTION
Although he might not have known it, George Steinbrenner potentially saved
his heirs $500 million by dying on July 13, 2010.1 In the year 2009, the estate tax
in the United States was forty-five percent, meaning that Steinbrenner's heirs would
have owed nearly $500 million dollars in taxes upon receiving his $1.1 billion
estate.2 At the date of his death, a fifty-five percent estate tax rate was set to take
effect on January 1, 2011, which would have led to his heirs paying closer to $600
million dollars in taxes.3 However, as a result of the George W. Bush
administration tax-cuts, the estate tax was repealed for the year 2010. In addressing
the planned expiration of the Bush tax cuts in December of 2010, Congress decided
not to require an estate tax to be imposed retroactively on the estates of those who
died during 2010, meaning that Steinbrenner's fortune passed to his heirs tax-free. 4
The Bush tax cuts were put into effect in the year 2001, and many people
assumed that with the election of President Barack Obama in 2008, Congress would
reinstate the estate tax with a compromise tax rate for the year 2010. However, as
a result of the inaction of Congress, the issue of the estate tax was not addressed
until December 17, 2010.6 There was much speculation as to how Congress would
choose to address this lack of estate tax in 2010 as many analysts and politicians
debated the issue. It was speculated that the year-long gap in the estate tax could
cost the U.S. treasury an estimated $14.8 billion, and after numerous highly
publicized deaths of wealthy individuals this year, many prominent attorneys and
senators began to notice this major effect of the lack of estate tax.7 "In the midst of
this terrible recession, the idea of giving billionaires a massive tax break is
obscene," stated Sen. Bernard Sanders of Vermont.8 "Already we have four
billionaire families who are not paying taxes - Steinbrenner's being the last one.
Many billions are being lost. We have to address that reality right now." 9 Henry
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Martha Kosydar, for everything they have done for me over the past 25 years. I would like to thank my
brother, Nathan Kosydar, for his unwavering loyalty and support. I would like to thank Professor Michael
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1. See, e.g., How Steinbrenner Saved His Heirs a $600 Million Tax Bill, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2010,
http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2010/07/13/how-steinbrenner-saved-his-heirs-a-600-million-tax-bill/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Brad Hamilton & Jeane MacIntosh, Death'$ Perfect Timing, N.Y. POST, July 14, 2010,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/deathperfect-timingNusLyGlMu8cn8kyepprVJP.
6. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (2010).
7. See Peter Whoriskey, Steinbrenner Heirs Could Save Millions From One-Year Gap in Estate Tax,
WASH. POST, July 14, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
dyn/content/article/2010/07/13/AR2010071305028.html.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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Christensen, a partner at McDermott Will & Emery and the president of the
International Academy of Trust and Estate Counsel, echoed a similar sentiment to
that of Sen. Sanders stating "[b]ecause of Mr. Steinbrenner's public name and
stature, his death may draw the attention of Congress-they simply have to decide
what to do."' 0
This debate came to an end on December 17, 2010, when Congress enacted the
2010 Tax ReliefAct, which did not prevent this one-year estate tax gap. Although
the Act imposed a thirty-five percent estate tax rate for 2010, it stated that, in order
to prevent potential hardships of retroactive legislation, the estates of decedents
who died prior to its enactment could elect to apply the original 2010 law of no
estate tax.12 Therefore, this 2010 estate tax enacted by Congress was not applied to
the Steinbrenner estate (and to the estates of the other 3 billionaires that died in
2010), allowing the heirs to inherit their father's estate tax- free.
The Steinbrenner family would have faced a potentially complicated decision if
the tax legislation had been imposed retroactively by Congress. As an article
written in the New York Post on July 14, 2010 speculated, if required to pay taxes
on their father's estate, the Steinbrenner heirs would have been forced to sell their
father's share of the New York Yankees in order to pay the taxes.13 However,
because of their ability to elect out of the 2010 Tax Relief Act, the Steinbrenners
will be able to keep the legendary baseball team that George Steinbrenner had
owned for the past 37 years.14 Therefore, the question this note will address is:
Would it have been constitutional for Congress to apply the 2010 Tax Relief Act
retroactively?
This note will discuss whether it would be constitutional for Congress to
retroactively apply an estate tax to those wealthy individuals who died in 2010 and,
if so, whether there would be any limitations Congress must consider in applying
the tax. The note will also discuss the ramifications of Congress enacting a
retroactive estate tax, and whether its negative effect on taxpayers would outweigh
its benefit to the United States.
Part I of this note will begin by looking at the opposing views regarding the
estate tax and the history of the estate tax in the United States. Part I will look at
the history of retroactive legislation to see how it has been used by Congress and
how it has been considered by the Supreme Court. Part III will discuss the specific
arguments used by taxpayers against retroactive tax legislation, and will examine
how courts have decided on each argument in the past. Part IV will examine the
Supreme Court's most recent decision regarding retroactive taxes: United States v.
Carlton. Part V will discuss the specific arguments used by the taxpayer against
retroactive estate tax legislation in NationsBank v. United States and will examine
how the Court of Appeals decided on each argument. Part VI, will look at the
potential ramifications of allowing Congress to impose a retroactive estate tax for
10. Id
11. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act, 124 Stat. 3296.
12. Id.
13. Hamilton & MacIntosh, supra note 5.
14. Id.
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2010. Finally, Part VII will determine whether Congress could constitutionally
impose an estate tax on decedents who died in 2010 based on the history of the
estate tax and the recent case law relating to retroactive implementation of estate
taxes. It will then discuss whether the negative effect that such a tax would have on
taxpayers outweighs the benefit it would provide to the United States.
PART I: BACKGROUND ON ESTATE TAx
Part L.A examines two theories of wealth transfers. The first theory of wealth
transfer, illustrated by John Locke, is used as support against the estate tax. The
second theory, illustrated by Thomas Jefferson, supports the belief that the estates
of wealthy individuals should be taxed before being passed down to their heirs.
Part 1.B looks at the Constitutional support -for the estate tax and Congress'
motivation in enacting the tax. It then tracks the development of the estate tax from
its enactment in 1916 to its current position in our society in 2011.
A. Opposing views on the taxation of wealth
Since before the founding of the United States, scholars have debated whether
the amount of wealth a decedent can transfer to his heirs at death should be limited.
The opposing views of John Locke and Thomas Jefferson exemplify the debate that
is still maintained in our society today. In Two Treatises of Government, John
Locke stated that a parent must be allowed to bequeath his property to his
children. 15 Locke stated, "God Planted in Men a strong desire also of propagating
their Kind, and continuing themselves in their Posterity, and this gives Children a
Title, to share in the Property of their Parents, and a Right to Inherit their
Possessions."l6 Thomas Jefferson had a different view of wealth transfers at death,
stating in a letter to James Madison that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living;
the dead have neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by any
individual ceases to be his when he himself ceases to be, and reverts to society."1 7
This debate on the estate tax and wealth transfer will continue to be a major
issue in the future of the United States, as a recent study conducted by John J.
Havens and Paul G. Schervish estimates that between 1998 and 2052 at least $41
trillion will be transferred from one generation to the next.18
B. The Development of the Estate Tax
The Constitution of the United States grants to Congress the power of taxation
15. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 88 (Sir Robert Filmer ed., The Legal
Classics Library 1994) (1690).
16. Id.
17. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789)
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=2220.
18. John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 Trillion Wealth Transfer Estimate is Still Valid: A
Review of Challenges and Comments, 7 J. GIFT PLAN. 11 (Jan. 2003).
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in Article I, Section 8 which states, "The Congress shall have the power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States. . ."19 Using the power
granted to it under this section, Congress adopted the estate tax in 1916 to raise
revenue during World War I and in response to concerns about the negative social
effects of wealth concentration.20 In the seventy years after its enactment, the estate
tax was viewed by most Americans as a necessary tool to curb concentrations of
wealth.21 However, the support for the estate tax diminished in the 1990s as
conservative lobbyists and members of Congress were able to gain the support of
the majority of the public in opposing what they referred to as the "death tax".22
President Bill Clinton was able to prevent conservative legislators from
eliminating the estate tax by overriding Congressional votes to repeal it in the years
1999 and 2000,23 but President George W. Bush vowed to cooperate with estate tax
repeal efforts in his campaign for the presidency in 2000. After his election,
President Bush came through on this promise to conservative voters by signing The
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001.24 This legislation
increased the estate tax exemption amount and reduced the tax rates from 2002 to
2009.25 The Act completely repealed the estate tax in 2010.26 However, because the
Senate's "Byrd Rule" requires that legislation affecting revenue beyond a ten-year
period be passed by a sixty percent majority, the Act was to "sunset" in 2011.27
Therefore, under the Act, after 2011 the fifty-five percent estate tax rate that was in
effect in 2001 was to be reinstated. 28
PART II: HISTORY OF RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION
Part II.A examines how retroactive legislation was viewed in the early United
States and how it has been used generally in the history of the country. Part II.B
examines how retroactive tax legislation differs from general retroactive legislation.
It then analyzes how retroactive tax legislation, specifically, has been viewed by the
courts of the United States.
A. Retroactive Legislation - Generally
A retroactive statute is defined as "one which gives to preenactment conduct a
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
20. James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (2001).
21. Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, The Estate Tax Non-Gap: Why Repeal a "Voluntary" Tax?, 20
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153,155 (2009).
22. Id.
23. Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. (1st. Sess. 1999); Death Tax
Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. 8, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000).
24. Caron & Repetti, supra note 21, at 155.
25. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38.
26. Id.
27. Caron & Repetti, supra note 21, at 155.
28. Id.
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different legal effect from that which it would have had without the passage of the
statute."29 In The Federalist No. 44, James Madison expressed concerns regarding
retroactive legislation.30 Madison stated that:
[b]ills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the
obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the
social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. . . The
sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which
has directed public councils. They have seen with regret and
indignation that sudden changes and legislative interferences, in
cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of
enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the more
industrious and less informed part of the community. They have
seen, too, that one legislative interference is but the first link of a
long chain of repetitions, every subsequent interference being
naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. They very rightly
infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting, which will
banish speculations on public measures, inspire general prudence
and industry, and give a regular course to the business society31
However, while Madison expressed a view which implied a fear of retroactive
legislation, nothing in the Constitution prevented Congress from enacting civil laws
retroactively.32 An early illustration of the lack of such provision came in Dash v.
Van Kleek, in which the Supreme Court of New York held that "[i]t is not pretended
that we have any express constitutional provision on the subject" of retroactive civil
law." 33 Although lower courts held that the Constitution did not explicitly prevent
retroactive civil legislation, the Supreme Court later qualified this belief, illustrated
by the court in Dash, holding that there could be a circumstance when a
retroactively applied tax is "so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the
constitutional limitation." 34
B. Retroactive Taxation
In his analysis of how the Supreme Court handled retroactive legislation prior
to 1960, Charles Hochman stated that the retroactive imposition of taxes must be
viewed separately from other retroactive legislation.3 5 He stated that the Court was
very reluctant to go against the judgment of Congress regarding retroactive taxation
because of the government's paramount interest in obtaining tax revenues.36 He
29. Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73
HARV. L. REV. 692, 692 (1960).
30. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison).
31. Id.
32. See generally Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
33. Id. at 505.
34. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938).
35. Hochman, supra note 29 at 706.
36. Id.
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also distinguished retroactive tax legislation from retroactive legislation involving
penalties or contractual obligations, stating that taxes are "a means of apportioning
the costs of government among those who benefit from it," and therefore, receive
more deference from the Court.37
In cases involving retroactive taxation, Hochman stated that the Court has two
major considerations: First, the Court looks at the ability of the taxpayer, at the time
of the transaction in dispute, to have reasonably foreseen that a tax would be
imposed at a later date.38 Second, the Court considers the likelihood that, if the
taxpayer had been able to foresee the retroactive tax, he would have altered his
conduct to avoid it.39 Hochman came to the conclusion that, based on the Court's
considerations, it would not be invalid for Congress to impose a tax if the taxpayer
acted in reliance on the nontaxability of the income. 40
As a result of the Court's deference to the legislature regarding retroactive tax
legislation, Congress enacted retroactive tax increases thirteen times between 1917
and 1976.41 Following this precedent, President Bill Clinton signed the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (hereafter "OBRA"). Section 13208 of this Act,
which was enacted in August of 1993, retroactively raised the estate tax rate from
fifty percent to fifty-five percent for the prior eight months, starting from January 1
of 1993.42 The constitutionality of §13208 of the OBRA was questioned in
NationsBank v. United States. The court's analysis of this case will be discussed
more thoroughly in Part V.
PART III: ARGUMENTS USED BY TAXPAYERS AGAINST RETROACTIVE TAX-
LEGISLATION
Part III examines the specific arguments that taxpayers have made against
retroactive taxes by discussing the prior case law for each argument and analyzing
how the arguments have developed in court over time. Part III will address each of
the arguments in the same order that the United States Court of Appeals addressed
them in NationsBank: Part III.A discusses the Apportionment Clause, Part III.B
focuses on the Ex Post Facto Clause, Part III.C discusses the Takings Clause, Part
III.D examines the Due Process Clause, and Part III.E looks at the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id
40. Id. at 706-07.
41. See Andrew G. Schultz, Note, Graveyard Robbery in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993: A
Modern Look at the Constitutionality of Retroactive Taxes, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 775, 814 n.273
(1994).
42. Id. at 775-776.
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A. The Apportionment Clause
The first argument that taxpayers have made against retroactive tax legislation
is that it violates the Apportionment Clause under Article 1, Section 9 of the
Constitution. The Apportionment Clause states that, "No Capitation, or other direct,
Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before
directed to be taken." 43 The Supreme Court elaborated that a tax is direct, and in
violation of the Apportionment Clause, if it is levied directly on property.44 A tax is
not direct, however, if it is levied on the transfer of property from one individual to
another.45
Milliken v. United States is an example of a case in which a taxpayer
challenged a retroactive estate tax on the basis that it was an unapportioned direct
tax. 46 In Milliken, a decedent gave each of his children corporate stock in 1916,
three years prior to his death.47 After the father's death, the Commissioner included
the shares of stock given to the children in the decedent's estate as a gift made in
contemplation of death.48 The tax owed by the heirs was computed based on the
value of the stock at the time of the decedent's death and using the tax rate provided
for in the Revenue Act of 1918 (which was higher than the tax rate provided for in
the Revenue Act of 1916 at the time the gift was made). 49 The executor of the estate
argued that the higher tax rate was a direct tax, because it was retroactive in that it
was measuring the tax by rates not in force at the time the gift was made. 50
The Supreme Court held that the higher tax rate was not a direct tax because it
was still a tax on an event - the giving of the gift of stock.5 1 In his opinion for the
majority, Justice Stone stated that, "[t]he present gift was subject to the excise when
made, and.. .a mere increase in the tax, pursuant to a policy of which the donor was
forewarned at the time he elected to exercise the privilege, did not change its
character." 52
B. The Ex Post Facto Clause
The next argument taxpayers have made against retroactive legislation is that it
is a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause under Article 1, Section 9 of the
Constitution, which states that, "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed."5 3 An ex post facto law is defined as a law that is "passed after the
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, §9 cl. 4.
44. Nations Bank v. U.S., 269 F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
45. Id.
46. Milliken v. U.S., 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
47. Id. at 18.
48. Id. at 19.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 20.
51. Id. at 24.
52. Id.
53. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
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occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retroactively changes the legal
consequences or relations of such fact or deed." 54 With respect to the hypothetical
situation in which Congress had elected to enact retroactive estate tax legislation in
2010, the taxpayer's argument would be that because the legislation occurred after
the death of the decedent, it is changing the legal consequences of his death, and is
therefore unconstitutional.
The first major case in which a party attempted to use the Ex Post Facto Clause
to argue against retroactive civil legislation was Calder v. Bull.55 In Calder, it was
argued by the plaintiffs in error that a resolution passed by the Connecticut
legislature, which set aside their previously favorable judgment from a probate
court, was an ex post facto law under the Constitution and therefore invalid.56 In its
decision, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause to apply
only to criminal statutes. 57 In the opinion written for the majority, Justice Chase
stated that he did not believe that the Ex Post Facto Clause "was inserted to secure
the citizen in his private rights, of either property or contracts . .. [B]ut the
restriction not to pass any ex post facto law, was to secure the person of the subject
from injury, or punishment, in consequence of such law." He then went on to list
the four types of laws the he considered to be within the words of the prohibition,
all of which were related to criminal offenses. 59 These included: laws making
something a crime when it was not a crime at the time it was committed, laws
aggravating a crime after it was committed, laws enhancing the punishment of a
crime after it was committed, and laws reducing the level of evidence necessary to
convict an offender after the act was committed.60
However, eighty years later the Supreme Court came to a different conclusion
in a case involving retroactive tax legislation. In Burgess v. Salmon, the Supreme
Court held that a retroactive tobacco tax enacted by the government was
unconstitutional as an ex post facto law.61 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Hunt
stated that the tax increase was unconstitutional because the government had the
option "[t]o impose upon the owner of the goods a criminal punishment or a
penalty" for refusing to pay the increased taxes before the tax became effective.62
In a much more recent case decided in 1999, Quarty v. U.S, 63 taxpayers again
attempted to use the Ex Post Facto Clause in a criminal context to challenge the
constitutionality of a retroactive tax, however in this case they were unsuccessful in
their argument. In Quarty, the taxpayers were challenging the constitutionality of
§13208 of the OBRA. Because the taxpayer's wife had died on January 12, 1993,
when the tax rate was fifty percent, the retroactive estate tax increase to fifty-five
54. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 520 (5th ed. 1979).
55. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
56. Id at 387.
57. Id at 390.
58. Id
59. Id
60. Id.
61. Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 384 (1878).
62. Id at 384-85.
63. Quarty v. U.S., 170 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 1999).
[Vol. 37:2232
"Death and Taxes" or Death without Taxes?
percent raised his tax liability by an additional $228,683.64 The taxpayers argued
that because the willful failure to pay estate taxes subjects a taxpayer to criminal
liability, retroactively increasing such taxes is an ex post facto law because the
taxpayer would be subject to criminal punishment for the failure to pay the
difference in the increase in tax over the rate that existed at the time of the
transfers. 65 While the court agreed with the taxpayer's position that the failure to
pay the increase in taxes would cause a criminal penalty, this time it held against
the taxpayer's ex post facto argument.66 The court reasoned that the estate tax did
not have to be paid until nine months after the death of the decedent, and by this
time the new law was in place. 67
Therefore, based on the court's more recent opinion in Quarty, if Congress
retroactively changes the estate tax rate after the death of the decedent but before
the payment of the tax is due, it will probably not be viewed as a violation of the Ex
Post Facto Clause.
C. The Takings Clause
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: "nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation."68 In Kane v. United States, the
taxpayer attempted to use the Takings Clause to support his argument that §13208
of the OBRA, which retroactively increased the estate taxes from fifty percent to
69fifty-five percent, was unconstitutional. In holding against the taxpayer, the
District Court stated that "[t]he Supreme Court has held that the Constitution can
consistently allow Congress to tax income while prohibiting Congress from
unlawful takings."70 Therefore, the District Court stated that the proper test in
analyzing whether a retroactive tax was a taking under the Takings Clause was to
determine whether the statute was "so arbitrary as to amount to a confiscation of
property rather than an exaction of tax."71 In looking at §13208 of the OBRA, the
court held that while the tax rate was high, it was not so arbitrary as to amount to a
confiscation, and therefore, was not a taking.72
D. The Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution states that
no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
64. Id. at 964.
65. Id. at 965.
66. See id. at 973.
67. Retroactive Reinstatement of Top Estate and Gift Tax Rates Under Sections 2001 and 2501 to 53
and 55 Percent is not Unconstitutional Taking or Ex Post Facto Law, 115 BANKING L.J. 422, 422-23(1998).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
69. Kane v. U.S., 942 F. Supp. 233, 234 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
70. Id.
7 1. Id.
72. See id.
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law."73 In Nichols v. Coolidge, the Supreme Court recognized that a retroactive tax
statute "may be so arbitrary and capricious as to amount to confiscation and offend
the Fifth Amendment." 74 This argument has been used by numerous taxpayers in
cases involving retroactive tax legislation.
In Nichols, after the decedent died in 1921, the Commissioner of the IRS
attempted to include property that she had transferred to others in 1917 as part of
her estate for purposes of the estate tax.75 Although the transfer took place in 1917,
the Commissioner justified his decision to include the transferred property in the
decedent's estate based on section 402(c) of the Revenue Act of 1919.76 In its
decision in favor of the taxpayer, Supreme Court held that because section 402(c)
required the value of property transferred prior to its passage to be included in the
gross value of the estate, it was of "arbitrary, whimsical and burdensome character"
and, therefore, invalid. 77
However, the decision in Nichols was limited in Milliken v. United States,
which held that a retroactive tax was not an unconstitutional violation of due
process.78 The taxpayer's challenge in Milliken was similar to the challenge by the
taxpayer in Nichols, involving the IRS Commissioner using section 402(c) of the
Revenue Act of 1918 to include shares of stock the decedent transferred prior to his
death in his estate for purposes of the estate tax. 79 Like the case in Milliken, the
taxpayer argued that this statute was a denial of due process in that it retroactively
reached a gift made before its enactment and that it measured the tax by rates not in
effect when the gift was made.80
However, in holding against the taxpayer in Milliken, the Supreme Court
limited its prior decision in Nichols stating that in that case it was determined that
the statute could not constitutionally be applied "to a gift inter vivos, not in
contemplation of death, and made long before the adoption of any congressional
legislation imposing an estate tax. . . ."8 It stated that in Nichols the legislation was
an infringement of the Due Process Clause because the gifts made by the taxpayer
were "completely vested beyond recall."82 The Court went on to say that "a tax is
not necessarily and certainly arbitrary and therefore invalid because retroactively
applied. . . [I]t does not suffice to say that the gift antedated the statute." 83 In
determining whether a retroactive statute violated a taxpayer's due process, the
Court stated that it was "necessary to consider the nature of the tax and of the
decedent's gift." 84 In this case, because there was no uncertainty that the transfer
73. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
74. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542 (1927).
75. Id at 532-33.
76. Id at 533.
77. Id at 542-43.
78. Milliken, 283 U.S. at 24-25.
79. Id at 19.
80. Id at 20.
81. Id at 21.
82. Id. at 20-21.
83. Id at 21-22.
84. Id at 22.
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would be taxed as a testamentary gift under the provision of the 1916 statute, it was
not a violation of due process to apply the higher rate of 1918.85
Seven years later, in Welch v. Henry, the Supreme Court again denied a
taxpayer's claim that a retroactive tax was a violation of due process.86 In his
opinion for the Court, Justice Stone provided further support for the holding that
retroactive taxation is not a violation of due process. He stated:
Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability
which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the
cost of government among those who in some measure are
privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens. Since no
citizen enjoys immunity from that burden, its retroactive imposition
does not necessarily infringe due process.
E. The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a state
from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." While this provision is directly applicable to the states rather than to the
federal government, in Bolling v. Sharpe the Supreme Court held that if a
government action would be unconstitutional if taken by a state under the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 89Therefore, another argument that has been used by taxpayers
against retroactive tax legislation is that it violates their protections under the Equal
Protection Clause. 90 The taxpayer argument is that because lawmakers are able to
create tax statutes with retroactive effects, they can use hindsight in creating tax
rates which allows them to target specific individuals or groups.91 The taxpayers
argue that those individuals or groups targeted by the retroactive taxes are not
receiving equal protection under the laws. 92
However, in Welch v. Henry, the Supreme Court created a standard which
made it very difficult for taxpayers to argue that retroactive statutes denied them of
equal protection under the laws. 93 In Welch, the taxpayer argued that a statute
which retroactively taxed only the recipients of corporate dividends was a denial of
equal protection. 94 In his opinion for the majority, Justice Stone stated that the
appropriate test for determining whether a retroactively applied tax is a denial of
equal protection is to ask "whether the thing taxed falls within a distinct class which
85. See id at 23-24.
86. Welch, 305 U.S. at 134.
87. Id. at 146-47.
88. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
89. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
90. Schultz, supra note 41 at 784.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. Welch, 305 U.S. at 134.
94. Id. at 142.
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may rationally be treated differently from other classes." 95 The Court held against
the taxpayer stating "[i]n the absence of any facts tending to show that the taxing
act, in its purpose or effect, is a hostile or oppressive discrimination ... we cannot
say the taxing statute denies equal protection."96
PART IV: THE SUPREME COURT AND RETROACTIVE TAX LEGISLATION: UNITED
STATES V CARL TON
Part IV will begin by giving the background on the most recent Supreme Court
case involving retroactive tax legislation: United States v. Carlton. It will then
discuss the arguments made by both the taxpayer and the government in the case.
Finally, it will examine the Supreme Court's analysis of the taxpayer's arguments
and will determine what effect the Court's holding could have on the
constitutionality of a potentially retroactive estate tax for the year 2010.
Background on Carlton v. United States
The issue presented to the Supreme Court in Carlton v. United States was
whether the retroactive application of the amendment to 26 U.S.C. §2057 violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 97 The provision at issue in this
case, which was part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and applicable to any estate that
filed a return after October 1986, 26 U.S.C. §2057, granted a deduction for half of
the proceeds of "any sale of employer securities by the executor of an estate" to "an
employee stock ownership plan." 98 The only other requirement necessary to qualify
for this deduction was that the sale of securities had to be made "before the date on
which the estate tax return was required to be filed."99
The respondent in this case, Jerry Carlton, was the executor of Willametta
Day's estate. Ms. Day died on September 29, 1985 and her estate tax return was due
on December 29, 1986, making her estate eligible for the deduction under §2057.
Mr. Carlton sought to take the deduction under §2057 and purchased 1.5 million
shares of MCI stock on December 10, 1986, which he then sold two days later at a
loss of $631,000. When Mr. Carlton filed the estate return on December 29, 1986,
he claimed the deduction under §2057 which reduced his estate tax by
$2,501,161. 100
In December of 1987, the IRS enacted an amendment to §2057 which made the
deduction available only to estates of decedents who owned the securities
immediately before their deaths.101 The amendment was retroactively applied to
95. Id. at 145.
96. Id. at 146.
97. U.S. v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 27 (1994).
98. Id. at 28 (quoting 26 U.S.C. §2057(1986)).
99. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. §2057(1986)).
100. Id.
101. Id at 29.
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become effective from the date §2057 was originally enacted in October of 1986.102
As a result of this retroactive amendment, the IRS disallowed the deduction Mr.
Carlton claimed under §2057 on the ground that the stock had not been owned by
Ms. Day immediately before her death. Mr. Carlton paid the deficiency but also
filed a claim for refund arguing that the retroactive application of the amendment
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 103
Ruling of the Court ofAppeals
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Mr.
Carlton that the retroactive tax legislation was a violation of due process. 104In
coming to this decision, the court first rejected "the notion of a per se rule that tax
statutes can always be retroactively applied so long as they do not create a 'wholly
new' tax". 10 5 The court then used three criteria in order to determine whether the
retroactive application of the amendment violated due process.The first factor the
court considered in its decision was whether or not the taxpayer had "actual or
constructive notice that the tax statute would be retroactively amended[.]"l06 The
court concluded that the respondent lacked notice that the statute would be
retroactively amended because "no act of the executive or legislative branch would
have given any forewarning of the 1987 amendment at the time the MCI ESOP
transaction occurred."10 7
The second factor the court considered was whether the taxpayer relied "to his
detriment on the pre-amendment tax statute.",1o The court determined that the
taxpayer had "detrimentally relied" on §2057 because he had "engaged in a costly
transaction for no other reason than the inducement provided by the new section
2057." 109 The court held that the $631,000 loss on the taxpayers purchase and sale
of MCI stock constituted the type of "detrimental reliance" that made retroactive
application of the amendment unconstitutional. 110
Lastly, the third factor that the court considered in its decision in favor of the
taxpayer was whether his reliance on the pre-amendment tax statute was
"reasonable". H Under this third factor, the court determined that the taxpayers
reliance on §2057 was reasonable because of "the lack of any indication that an
amendment was in the offing and in the context of the large tax incentives Congress
has given to ESOPs." 
1 2
102. Id.
103. Id
104. Carlton v. U.S., 972 F.2d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 1992).
105. Id. at 1056.
106. Id. at 1059.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 1060.
111. Id. at 1059.
112. Id. at l061.
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Although the majority held that the taxpayer met the three criteria and that the
- - 113retroactive application was unconstitutional, it was not a unanimous opinion. In
dissent, Judge Norris stated that the retroactive application of the amendment was
not unconstitutional noting that "[t]he Supreme Court and our sister circuits have
made clear that constructive notice to the taxpayer is usually implied for a change in
the rate or basis of an existing tax." l4
Following the ruling by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the United
States appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1993.115 The briefs of
both parties and the opinion of the Supreme Court are discussed below:
Brieffor the United States
In its brief to the Supreme Court, the United States made two main points to
support its argument that the Court of Appeals had decided this case incorrectly.
First, it argued that the amendment to §2057 satisfied the requirements of due
process because it constituted a rational means of furthering a legitimate
purpose. 117 The second argument made by the United States was that the three-part
test used by the Court of Appeals for determining whether the amendment satisfied
the requirements of due process lacked any constitutional foundation.
In support of its argument that the retroactive amendment met the requirements
of due process, the United States quoted the Supreme Court's decision in Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., which stated that, "[p]rovided that the
retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose
furthered by a rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation
remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches."1 19
In support of this point, the brief further quoted from the Supreme Court's decision
in Usery v. Turner, stating that
[r]etroactive legislation drawn to achieve a legitimate purpose does
not violate the Due Process Clause even if the statute imposes a
liability that 'was not anticipated' or 'upsets otherwise settled
expectations' and 'even though the effect of the legislation is to
impose a new duty or liability based on past acts'. 120
The brief further argued that legislation enacted by Congress to cure errors in
prior tax legislation is especially fit for retroactive treatment, and therefore should
not be held to be a violation of due process. In order to show that §2057 was meant
as curative legislation to close unintended tax loopholes, the brief quoted the House
113. Id. at 1062.
114. Id. at 1064.
115. U.S. v. Carlton, 972 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 62 U.S.L.W. 3242 (U.S. Oct. 4,
1993)(No 92-1941).
116. U.S. v. Carlton, No. 92-1941, 1993 WL 638225 at *12 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1993).
117. Id. at 12.
118. Id. at 19.
119. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984).
120. Id (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,16 (1976)).
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Committee Report which stated that the original provision "would not have been
adopted in its present form had the full extent of the revenue impact and the effect
of the provision been recognized."'121 The House Committee Report went on to say
that "it is now necessary to modify the provision to bring the revenue loss in line
with the original estimate and Congressional intent."1 22 Therefore, the brief argued,
because an unintended loophole was written into the statute, and because Congress
acted promptly to correct it, it could not be said that the retroactive correction
violated the Due Process Clause. 123
After making its argument that the retroactive amendment furthered a
legitimate legislative purpose, the brief for the United States then attacked the
three-part test used by the Court of Appeals.124 The brief for the petitioner argued
that the first part of the criteria used by the court was invalid because every
taxpayer is deemed to have constructive notice of the possibility of changes in the
provisions of existing tax laws.125 Quoting from Milliken, the brief stated that every
taxpayer "should be regarded as taking his chances of any increase in the tax burden
which might result from carrying out the established policy of taxation.',126
The brief then argued that the court further erred in holding that the taxpayer's
reliance on the original provision was reasonable. Again citing Usery, the United
States argued that "[a] taxpayer cannot 'reasonably' rely on the assumption that
Congress will not retroactively cure its prior drafting errors." 127 Therefore, for the
reasons discussed above, the United States argued that the decision of the Court of
Appeals should be reversed. 128
Brieffor Carlton
The brief for Carlton focused on the language from Welch stating that "a tax
statute may not be applied retroactively if an unduly 'harsh and oppressive' result
arises from the 'nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it is laid."'
1 29
Applying the "harsh and oppressive" test from Welch, the brief for Carlton stressed
that the retroactive amendment of § 2057 should be prohibited for four main
reasons. 130 First, the respondent argued that the executor had no notice that
Congress would revoke the deduction.131 Secondly, the brief stated that the
executor relied on the availability of the deduction when entering into the
121. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 391, at 1045 (1987)).
122. Id.
123. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 115, at 17.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1930).
126. Id. (quoting Milliken, 283 U.S. at 23).
127. Id. (quoting Usery, 428 U.S. at 16).
128. Id.
129. Brief for Respondant at 7, U.S. v. Carlton, No. 92-1941, 1993 WL 664654 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1993)
(citing US. v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 568-69 (1986) and Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 135, 147 (1938)).
130. Id. at 12.
131. Id.
2392012]
Journal ofLegislation
transaction, and otherwise would not have engaged in it.132 Thirdly, it stated that
the executor was injured as a result of selling the stock below market value.133
Lastly, and most importantly, the respondent argued that unlike the prior cases cited
by the United States, the statute in this case specifically induced the executor to
further the public goal of promoting employee stock ownership.1 34
The respondent's brief focused the majority of its attention on the fact that, in
this case, the statute which was retroactively amended induced the taxpayer to act in
the way that he acted. The brief argued that "[i]t is singularly harsh and oppressive
for Congress to use the inducement of a tax benefit to encourage private support of
the public goal of promoting stock ownership and, subsequently, to deny a taxpayer
the very benefit that induced the purchase and sale."1 35 Quoting Professor Laurence
Tribe, the brief for the respondent stated that it is "'a simple constitutional
principle,' that when it induces reliance, 'government must keep its word'. 136
The brief for the respondent also used the fact that the original tax provision
had induced the taxpayer to engage in the transaction as a way to distinguish this
case from the cases the United States was using to support its argument. The
respondent argued that none of the cases cited by the United States involved
"government inducement of a transaction to accomplish a public goal with private
funds" and therefore, they were irrelevant to support the case at hand. 137
The Majority Opinion of the Supreme Court
After hearing the arguments by both the taxpayer and the United States, the
Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that the
retroactive tax legislation was not a violation of due process because it was
"rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose."l 38 In his opinion for the
majority of the Court, Justice Blackmun stated, "the Court of Appeals held the
congressional enactment to an unduly strict standard,"l39 and that the cases relied
upon by the lower court in reaching its decision followed an approach that "has
long been discarded." 4 0 In his analysis of the cases relied upon by the Court of
Appeals, Justice Blackmun cited United States v. Hemme, stating," [t]o the extent
their authority survives, they have been limited to cases involving 'the creation of a
wholly new tax,' and their 'authority is of limited value in assessing the
constitutionality of subsequent amendments that bring about certain changes in
operation of the tax laws."'
41
132. Id. at 12-13.
133. Id. at 13.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 6.
136. Id at 10 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 619 (2d ed.,
1988)).
137. Id. at 64.
138. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 35.
139. Id. at 35.
140. Id. at 34.
141. Id. (quoting Hemme, 476 U.S. 568).
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In its opinion, the Supreme Court focused on two main factors in holding that
the retroactive amendment met the requirements of due process. First, the Court
noted that Congress' purpose in enacting the amendment "was neither illegitimate
nor arbitrary."l42 In making this determination, the Court noted that there was little
doubt that the amendment was adopted as a curative measure and that its action in
correcting it was reasonable to prevent a significant and unexpected revenue
lOSS.143
The second factor that the Court noted was that "Congress acted promptly and
established only a modest period of retroactivity."l 44 The Court further elaborated
on this point stating "[h]ere, the actual retroactive effect of the 1987 amendment
extended for a period only slightly greater than one year." 45
The Court also addressed the taxpayer's specific arguments beginning with the
fact that the retroactive amendment was a violation of due process because he had
detrimentally relied on the preamendment version. 146 In response to this argument,
the Court stated that "reliance alone is insufficient to establish a constitutional
violation." Instead, the Court stated that "[t]ax legislation is not a promise, and a
taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal Revenue Code."l 48
The Court similarly dismissed the taxpayer's argument that his lack of notice
regarding the retroactive amendment made it a violation of due process. 149 In
response to this argument, the Court cited its decision in Milliken stating that a
taxpayer "should be regarded as taking his chances of any increase in the tax burden
which might result from carrying out the established policy of taxation.',150
Justice O'Connor 's Concurrence
Although Justice O'Connor agreed with the outcome reached by the majority,
she wrote a concurring opinion in the case that differed from the reasoning given by
the majority. She stated that the majority opinion's emphasis on Congress'
"correcting" a "mistake" was irrelevant and that "it is sufficient for due process
analysis if there exists some legitimate purpose underlying the retroactivity
provision."151
Justice O'Connor also expressed a desire to limit the time period in which
Congress can retroactively amend statutes, stating that "[t]he governmental interest
in revising the tax laws must at some point give way to the taxpayer's interest in
142. Id. at 32.
143. Id. at 31-32.
144. Id. at 32.
145. Id. at 33.
146. Id
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 34 (citing Miliken, 283 U.S., at 23).
151. Id. at 36-37 (alteration in original).
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finality and repose."' 52 She stated that in every case where a retroactive statute
survived a due process challenge, the law applied retroactively "only for a relatively
short period prior to enactment" and that "[a] period of retroactivity longer than the
year preceding the legislative session in which the law was enacted would raise, in
my view, serious constitutional questions."l53
PART V: ARGUMENTS USED AGAINST RETROACTIVE ESTATE TAX IN
NATIONsBANK
NationsBank v. United States is a recent case involving retroactive tax
legislation which interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Carlton. Because, in
NationsBank, a tax was retroactively applied in a situation that is very similar that
of the 2010 Tax ReliefAct (if it had been applied retroactively), it provides valuable
insight into how the Supreme Court would potentially view a retroactive application
of the Act. Part V will begin by giving the background of the NationsBank case. It
will then give an analysis of all of the arguments made by the taxpayer and will
discuss how the Federal Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held on each
argument.
Background on NationsBank v. United States
NationsBank v. United States involved § 13208 of the OBRA, which was signed
into law by President Bill Clinton in August of 1993.154 NationsBank, the plaintiff
in this case, was the executor of Ms. Ellen Clayton Garwood's estate and was
seeking a refund on estate taxes paid after her death.155 Ms. Clayton died in March
of 1993, with a gross estate of over $28 million, and following the retroactive rate
increase provided for in §13208 of the OBRA, her estate was taxed at fifty-five
percent rather than fifty percent.156 In this case heard by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2001, the executor sought a refund of
$1,320,190.07, the difference in tax paid under the retroactively applied fifty-five
percent rate and the former fifty percent rate that was in effect when the decedent
died.' 57 NationsBank asserted that this retroactive legislation violated several
provisions of the Constitution, including: the Apportionment Clause, the Ex Post
Facto Clause, the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection
Clause.158 However, as discussed below, after interpreting the decision of the
Supreme Court in Carlton, the Court of Appeals held that the retroactive tax rate
increase did not violate the Constitution and was therefore valid legislation.
152. Id. at 37-38.
153. Id. at 38.
154. NationsBonk, 269 F.3d at 1334.
155. Id at 1334.
156. Id
157. Id.
158. Id
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Apportionment Clause Argument
Following the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Milliken, the court in
NationsBank held that §13208 of the OBRA did not violate the Apportionment
Clause. 159 The court stated that §13208 did not impose a new tax, but "merely
increased the rate of the indirect tax on the transfer which had occurred earlier."I1o
Citing Milligan, the court held that the five percent retroactive increase in the tax
rate did not change the character of the estate tax from non-direct to direct. 161
Because it held that the tax was still on the transfer or the property, rather than on
the property itself, the Court held that §13208 was constitutional under the
Apportionment Clause. 162
Ex Post Facto Argument
The court in NationsBank, similar to the court in Quarty, held that the increase
in estate taxes under §13208 of the OBRA was not an ex post facto law.163 The
court began by stressing the language used in Calder which stated that the ex post
facto provision applies solely to criminal enactments.164 It then stated that although
taxpayers are often subject to criminal liability for refusing to pay taxes, if the
entire tax code were held to be criminal in nature, every retroactive tax law would
become an unconstitutional ex post facto enactment. 165 The court stated that this
could not be the correct interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause because the
Supreme Court's decision in Carlton acknowledged Congress' constitutional
authority to enact tax laws retroactively.166
The court distinguished the facts of this case from that of Burgess v. Salmon, an
1878 case in which the Supreme Court held that a retroactive tax increase on
tobacco constituted an ex post facto law. 1 In distinguishing this case from that of
Burgess, the court emphasized that the taxpayers in Burgess could not have avoided
the taxable increase on goods they had already shipped, and therefore, could not
have avoided criminal penalties under the retroactive statute. In NationsBank, the
taxpayer had already paid the additional tax required by the statute and, therefore,
was not at risk of having criminal sanctions imposed on them by the government. 169
Because of this distinction, the court reasoned that the holding by the Supreme
159. Id. at 1336.
160. Id. at 1335.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1336.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Burgess, 97 U.S. at 384.
168. NationsBank, 269 F.3d at 1336.
169. Id
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Court in Burgess did not apply to the case in NationsBank.
Takings Clause Argument
The court in NationsBank held that the retroactive estate tax statute contained
in the OBRA was not a violation of the Takings Clause. The court began its analysis
by citing Nichols v. Coolidge, which stated that a retroactive tax may constitute a
taking under the Fifth Amendment if the retroactive feature makes it "so arbitrary
and capricious as to amount to confiscation."1 70 However, the court stated that
because the taxpayer's retroactivity argument failed under the due process standards
discussed below, it also failed "arbitrary and capricious" standard of the Takings
Clause. 171
Citing United States v. Darusmont, the court also stated that a retroactive tax
could be considered a taking if the retroactive reach extends beyond "short and
limited periods required by the practicalities of producing national legislation." 172
In determining whether the retroactive reach fell within the "short and limited
period" standard, the court used the date from when the legislative process began,
rather than the date §13208 was enacted. 173 Because the legislative process began
in February of 1993, and the retroactive reach was extended back to January 1,
1993, the court held that this was a "modest" revision under the Carlton standard
and, therefore, encompassed only a "short and limited" period as required by
Darusmont.174
Due Process Clause Argument
Based on the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Carlton, the court held
that § 13208 was not a violation of due process.'7 5 Citing Carlton, the court stated
that in order for retroactive legislation to satisfy the Due Process Clause, "a rational
legislative purpose" must justify its enactment.17 6 Citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., the court further stated that "the burden is on one complaining of a due
process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and
irrational way."1 77
Noting that the Court in Carlton found a fourteenth-month retroactive period to
be "modest" and valid, the court stated NationsBank had not shown that the eight-
month retroactive period was arbitrary and irrational. The court also held that the
uniform fifty-five percent rate on all estate tax transfers was sufficient to show that
170. Id. (citing Nichols, 274 U.S. at 542-43).
171. Id. at 1337.
172. Id. (citing United States. v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 296-97 (1981)).
173. Id. at 1336-37.
174. Id. at 1337.
175. Id.
176. Id. (citing Carlton, 512 U.S. at 31).
177. Id. (citing Usery, 428 U.S. at 15).
178. Id
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the legislature had a rational purpose for the retroactive enactment.179 Therefore,
NationsBank failed to show that § 13208 was a violation of the Due Process Clause.
Equal Protection Clause Argument
Finally, the Court in NationsBank held that § 13208 of the OBRA did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.180 NationsBank argued
that §13208 violated the estate's equal protection rights under the laws by requiring
it to pay taxes at a rate higher than was required when the taxable event occurred
(the death of the decedent). 1 However, rather than discriminating against a narrow
group of taxpayers, the court held that §13208 actually promoted tax equity by
requiring the heirs of decedents who died from January to August of 1993 to pay
the same rate in estate taxes as those heirs who decedents died following August
1993.182 The court stated that if it were not for the retroactive effect of §13208, the
heirs to the decedents who died prior to August of 1993 would be given
advantageous treatment and, therefore, it actually furthered equal protection
principles rather than violated them.183
PART VI: POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF IMPOSING A RETROACTIVE ESTATE
TAX IN 2010
If Congress were to have retroactively imposed an estate tax in 2010, it would
have had both positive and negative ramifications. Part VI.A will first examine the
arguments in favor of retroactive tax legislation and then Part VI.B will discuss the
arguments against imposing a retroactive estate tax on heirs.
A. Benefits ofRetroactive Taxation
Proponents of retroactive tax legislation have noted several benefits that
applying taxes retroactively would have on the United States. To begin with, they
argue that retroactive tax legislation can be necessary to prevent revenue loss.184
Advocates of retroactive tax legislation argue that it would be improper to allow a
tax loophole to continue for even a short period of time while the United States
Treasury is suffering.iss As discussed above, in this case, the fact that Congress did
not retroactively apply estate taxes to decedents who died in 2010 could have cost
the United States government up to an estimated $14.8 billion dollars. 186
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1338.
181. Id.
182. Id
183. Id.
184. Note, Setting Effective Dates for Tax Legislation: A Rule of Prospectivity, 84 HARV. L. REV. 436,
441 (1970).
185. Id.
186. Whoriskey, supra note 7.
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Proponents of retroactive tax legislation argue that, especially while the United
States government is in a recession, that is revenue that cannot afford to be lost.187
Proponents of retroactive taxation also argue that fairness demands that
corrections to tax loopholes be made retroactively in order to put all taxpayers on
equal footing. The case of George Steinbrenner is a perfect illustration of this
argument. Because Mr. Steinbrenner died prior to January 1, 2011, his heirs could
elect not to have the 2010 Tax ReliefAct applied to his estate, therefore avoiding the
estate tax. However, if someone in a similar situation had died on January 1, 201 1,
their estate could not have made that election and would be forced to pay hundreds
of millions of dollars in estate taxes. Proponents of retroactive legislation argue that
it is not fair to apply the new tax legislation to the second decedent, and not to
George Steinbrenner, who just happened to die in the right tax window.
B. Negative Ramifications ofRetroactive Taxation
Critics of retroactive taxation have argued that, from a practical standpoint, it
creates a lack of fairness and predictability that far outweighs the benefits it
provides. Critics argue that "[r]etroactivity often defeats reliance and penalizes a
taxpayer for acting in a manner which was previously permitted. This is both harsh
and inequitable."189 As illustrated in Carlton, many times taxpayers engage in
transactions as a part of a tax planning strategy. If the taxpayers cannot have faith
that the provisions they are relying on will not be retroactively changed by
Congress, they cannot make financial decisions with any level of confidence and, as
stated by a critic of retroactive tax legislation, "it is impossible to quantify the cost
resulting from the loss of taxpayer confidence in the taxing system due to the
perceived inequities produced by retroactivity."l90
In his analysis of retroactive legislation, Charles Hochman elaborated on these
arguments as to why Congress should refrain from enacting laws retroactively.191
He began by referencing James Madison's desire to protect people from
"fluctuating policy" of the legislature.192 He stated that "to the extent that statutory
law should serve as a guide to individual conduct, this purpose is thwarted by
retroactive amendments." 1 93 He further argued that retroactive legislation promotes
hostility from taxpayers because statutes may be passed by Congress with an exact
understanding of whom they will benefit and who they will hurt.194
Therefore, critics argue that retroactive tax legislation diminishes the
predictability in the law and fails to protect taxpayers from changes that they cannot
control. Especially in the tax field where knowledge of the law is vital to successful
187. Id.
188. Setting Effective Dates for Tax Legislation: A Rule ofProspectivity, supra note 184, at 441.
189. Id. at 439.
190. Id. at 441.
191. Hochman, supra note 29, at 693.
192. Id.
193. Id
194. Id.
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long-range planning, retroactive taxation diminishes the confidence that taxpayers
can have in their investment strategy.
PART VII: CONCLUSION - SHOULD CONGRESS IMPOSE THE ESTATE TAX
RETROACTIVELY?
Part VII will discuss whether or not Congress could impose the estate tax from
the 2010 Tax ReliefAct retroactively, and if so, if it would be beneficial for them to
do so. Part VII.A will analyze whether it would be constitutional for Congress to
impose the estate tax retroactively, based on the case law from Carlton and
NationsBank. It will also discuss what limitations, if any, Congress must abide by
in retroactively applying the law. Part VII.B will discuss whether the benefits of
imposing the estate tax retroactively outweigh the negative ramifications that it
could have on the taxpayers. The note will end by discussing whether or not
Congress made the correct decision in refraining from applying the estate tax
retroactively to families such as the Steinbrenners.
A. Constitutionality ofRetroactive Estate Tax
Based on the Supreme Court's analysis of retroactive taxation in Carlton and
the recent Court of Appeals decision in NationsBank, if Congress had
hypothetically decided to apply the estate tax from the 2010 Tax Relief Act
retroactively, it would probably be held to be constitutional.
As was the case in NationsBank, the taxpayer could first attempt to argue that
the retroactive tax legislation was unconstitutional based on the Apportionment
Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Takings Clause, and the Equal Protection
Clause. However, these arguments will all probably fail based on the court's
decision in NationsBank.
As was the case with §13208 of the OBRA in NationsBank, the retroactive
estate tax amendment would be considered a tax on the transfer of property (from
the decedent to the heir), rather than on the property itself, making it constitutional
under the Apportionment Clause. Similarly, as was the case in NationsBank, the
Court would also strike down an ex post facto argument using the reasoning of
Calder which limited the Ex Post Facto Clause as applying solely to criminal
enactments. The argument that the retroactive enactment violates the Takings
Clause would probably not succeed because, as stated by the Court in Nichols, it is
not "so arbitrary and capricious as to amount to confiscation."l95 Finally, the
argument that the retroactive legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause would
also be unsuccessful because, as the court stated in NationsBank, the retroactive
estate tax legislation would actually promote tax equity by requiring heirs of
decedents who died in the year 2010 to pay the same estate tax rate as those heirs
whose decedents died after that date.
Similar to the case in Carlton, the taxpayer's primary argument against the
195. Nichols, 274 U.S. at 542.
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retroactive estate tax would be that it is a violation of the Due Process Clause.
However, following the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Carlton, the
taxpayer would probably not be successful in this argument. The standard used by
the Court in Carlton for determining whether retroactive legislation met the
requirements of due process is whether it is "rationally related to a legitimate
legislative purpose."196 In determining that the amendment to the tax code was
constitutional in Carlton, the Court noted that it was "neither illegitimate nor
arbitrary" and that Congress "established only a modest period of retroactivity."l97
In this case, because the government is losing billions of dollars in revenue as a
result of the lack of an estate tax for 2010, it would probably be considered a
"legitimate legislative purpose."l 98
The taxpayer could attempt to make the same argument used against the
retroactive application in Carlton, that it was unduly "harsh and oppressive,"
however that would probably not be successful. The Steinbrenners' argument that a
retroactive estate tax is "harsh and oppressive" is actually weaker than the
taxpayer's losing argument in Carlton. In Carlton, the taxpayer acted in reliance on
the statute that was retroactively changed by purchasing the MCI stock to gain an
estate tax advantage, whereas George Steinbrenner did not take any action based on
the estate tax legislation, he just happened to die in the window when there was no
estate tax. Also, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Carlton, that authority
"has [been] long since discarded" and is now limited to cases involving "the
creation of a wholly new tax." 1 99 Therefore, because Congress is just changing the
rate of the estate tax which has existed for years, rather than creating an entirely
new tax, this argument would probably fail.
Although Congress would probably have the power to enact the legislation
retroactively, it might be limited on the amount of time it can take to enact the
retroactive legislation based on Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Carlton. In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor noted that in the prior cases in which
retroactive legislation survived a due process challenge the law applied
retroactively "for only a relatively short period prior to enactment."200 She went on
to say that a retroactive period of longer than a year would, in her opinion, raise
serious constitutional questions. 201 Therefore, although it is unknown whether the
rest of the current Court shares Justice O'Connor's opinion, Congress' ability to
enact a retroactive law might be limited to a time period as short as one year in
length.
However, because Congress enacted the estate tax legislation on December 17,
2010, if it had hypothetically decided to apply it retroactively, it would have created
a retroactive period of less than a year. Therefore, if Congress had chosen to enact
retroactive estate tax legislation in 2010, rather than allowing estates to elect out of
196. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 35.
197. Id. at 31-32.
198. Id. at 35.
199. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 31-32.
200. Id. at 38.
201. Id.
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retroactive application, it would probably have survived a constitutional challenge
based on due process.
B. Should Congress Enact Retroactive Estate Tax Legislation?
Based on its precedent in Carlton, the Supreme Court probably would have
held the hypothetical retroactive application of the estate tax in 2010 to be
constitutional. Therefore, the question becomes: Should Congress have applied the
2010 estate tax retroactively? In making the determination of whether or not to
enact retroactive tax legislation, Congress must balance its interest in creating
revenue and promoting fairness with its interest in protecting the taxpayer from
"fluctuating policy." 202
In this case, based on the totality of the circumstances, Congress should have
applied the 2010 Tax Relief Act retroactively, rather than giving the estates an
opportunity to elect out of the retroactive application. The argument given by
critics of retroactive tax legislation, that it "penalizes a taxpayer for acting in a
manner which was previously permitted,"203 is inapplicable in this case, as no
taxpayer performed any action in reliance on the estate tax legislation. Unlike the
taxpayer in Carlton, who purchased stock in reliance on a statute that was
retroactively amended, it was not part of George Steinbrenner's estate planning
strategy to die in the year 2010. While the lack estate tax was a convenient benefit
he received based on the timing of his death, he did nothing to receive the benefit
other than dying. The only taxpayers who could have taken any action in reliance
on the estate tax legislation would be those who deliberately took their own lives in
2010 to reduce the tax burden on their estates, and for policy reasons that is not a
reliance the government should be worried about protecting. It is also important to
note that, although Congress did not enact the estate tax legislation until December
of 2010, this legislation had been anticipated for years which gave estate planners
the necessary time to make alternative plans in the event that it did occur.
Although it is important for taxpayers to have confidence that the provisions
they rely on will not be retroactively changed, because there was no legal action
that a taxpayer could have taken in reliance on the 2010 estate tax legislation,
Congress should have placed more of an emphasis on promoting equity between
taxpayers. From a policy standpoint, it is not equitable that the estate of a decedent
who died on December 31, 2010, can elect to avoid paying an estate tax, while the
estate of a person who died the next day on January 1, 2011, could be required to
pay hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes. Instead, it is only fair that Congress
enact retroactive estate tax legislation that will result in estates of similar values
paying similar amounts of taxes. In this case, because there could be a drastic
disparity between the amount of taxes paid on similar estates, Congress should have
prioritized finding a way to ensure parity by requiring the estates of all decedents
who died in 2010 to pay an amount comparable to that which will be paid by estates
202. Madison, supra note 30.
203. Setting Effective Dates for Tax Legislation: A Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 184, at 439.
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of those who die in 2011.
However, because Congress allowed the estates of decedents to elect out of the
2010 estate tax, it potentially sacrificed $14.8 billion in tax revenue and created
major inequity in the tax system.204 While the estates of decedents who died on or
after January 1, 2011, are required to pay estate taxes, for the Steinbrenner family
and the estates of other decedents who died in 2010, Congress' decision not to
retroactively apply the 2010 Tax ReliefAct means death without taxes.
204. Whoriskey, supra note 7.
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